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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Vanessa Hunter appeals from final orders of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which 
imposed: (1) two concurrent terms of imprisonment of eighteen 
months each, and a three year period of supervised release; and 
(2) restitution in an aggregate amount of $75,000 as a condition 
of supervised release.  Because the district court properly 
applied Guideline Section 3B1.1 in finding that Hunter was a 
manager of a criminal conspiracy and subject to a two level 
enhancement pursuant to Section 3B1.1(c), we will affirm those 
portions of the orders of the district court.  On Hunter's claim 
that the district court failed to make the required factual 
findings to support its restitution orders, however, we will 
reverse and remand. 
 
 I. 
  
 Nu Skin International of Provo, Utah, markets Nu Skin 
skin-care products through a multi-level network of independent 
distributors, buying wholesale and selling at a markup.  To 
expand its distributor network, the company encourages 
sponsorship of new distributors; as new distributors are 
recruited, sponsors are promoted to "executive" or "upline" 
distributors of the new "downline" distributor.  Nu Skin pays 
monthly commissions to upline executives whose downline 
distributors attain a target sales volume. 
 Hunter began selling Nu Skin in the summer of 1990, and 
she signed as a downline distributor of Joseph Fanelli.  Hunter 
contends that Fanelli assumed total control over Hunter's daily 
affairs, including controlling her business matters and personal 
checking account.  She maintains that her tolerance of Fanelli's 
control was based on her dependent nature and the promise that 
Fanelli would make Hunter a successful upline distributor.  
 Fanelli urged Hunter to locate sources of credit card 
account numbers.  Fanelli and Hunter planned to use these account 
numbers to purchase Nu Skin products, which they would then sell 
on consignment in health centers and hair salons.  Thereafter, in 
the late summer or early fall of 1990, Hunter telephoned a 
friend, Martin Guzman.  After Guzman said he did not have access 
to credit card data, Hunter urged him to recruit as her source 
Roel "Roy" Trevino, an employee of the St. Anthony Hotel in San 
Antonio, Texas.  Over the following few weeks, Hunter discussed 
the matter several times with both Guzman and Trevino, and 
  
offered to pay Trevino for every stolen credit card account 
number. 
 Hunter maintains that she initially believed that 
Fanelli would repay Nu Skin as a "loan."  She also contends that 
she feared that Fanelli would physically harm her or her family 
if she were to disobey him.  According to Hunter, Fanelli even 
boasted of his "ties to the mob" as a means of intimidating her.  
 Throughout the month of October 1990, Trevino 
periodically stole credit card data from the St. Anthony Hotel 
and read it over the telephone to Hunter.  Ultimately he 
compromised the accounts of more than 200 patrons.  Hunter paid 
Trevino by arranging for money to be wired to him in San Antonio.  
Between October 1990 and December 1991, Hunter, Fanelli, and 
others working at their direction, used Visa and Mastercard 
account numbers supplied by Trevino and other sources to place 
orders for Nu Skin at a total cost in excess of $293,000.  Hunter 
and Fanelli caused orders to be shipped to persons who were 
willing to hold the shipments until they or any of several 
accomplices could pick up the shipments.  In addition, Hunter and 
Fanelli caused all fraudulent orders to be made by "distributors" 
they sponsored, sometimes creating fictitious distributors by 
executing new distributor agreements using aliases.  By placing 
orders in the names of distributors purportedly sponsored by 
Hunter and Fanelli, they also caused Nu Skin to issue them checks 
totalling more than $28,000 for commissions earned on the 
fraudulent orders. 
  
 Fanelli reaped most of the profits from the scheme.  
Hunter became financially dependent on her sister and eventually 
was supported by food stamps.  She later declared bankruptcy.  
Since November of 1993, however, Hunter has acquired a job at 
Fitch Investors in New York where she has continued to work. 
 The United States filed an information in the District 
of New Jersey alleging credit card fraud, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 
1029(a)(2), and filed a superseding information in the Western 
District of Texas, alleging conspiracy to traffic in and use 
unauthorized access devices, contrary to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(2) 
and (b)(2).  Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the superseding information from the Western District 
of Texas was transferred to the District of New Jersey. 
 Hunter and the Government reached a negotiated plea 
agreement, and she entered her pleas of guilty.  When Hunter re-
appeared before the district court for sentencing, the district 
court imposed two concurrent terms of imprisonment, each of 
eighteen months, and a three-year period of supervised release.  
Restitution was also ordered in the aggregate amount of $75,000 
as a condition of the supervised release.  This appeal followed. 
 
 II. 
 Hunter argues that the district court improperly 
increased the base offense level by two points upon the erroneous 
finding that Hunter was a "manager" or "supervisor," pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).  The determination of Hunter's aggravating 
role in the offense is essentially factual in nature and, 
  
therefore, we will reverse the findings of the district court 
only for clear error.  See United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 
126-27 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 Hunter's base offense level was enhanced two levels by 
the district court under § 3B1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines 
in order to reflect Hunter's role as a manager/supervisor in the 
credit card conspiracy.  Section 3B1.1 provides: 
 
 Based on the defendant's role in the offense, 
increase the offense level as follows: 
  
 (a) If the defendant was an organizer or 
leader of a criminal activity that involved 
five or more participants or was otherwise 
extensive, increase by 4 levels. 
 
 (b) If the defendant was a manager or 
supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) 
and the criminal activity involved five or 
more participants or was otherwise extensive, 
increase by 3 levels. 
 
 (c) If the defendant was an organizer, 
leader, manager, or supervisor in any 
criminal activity other than described in (a) 
or (b), increase by 2 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. 
 The guideline commentary lists factors that should be 
considered by the sentencing court in determining whether to 
apply the "aggravating role enhancement": (1) the exercise of 
decision making authority; (2) the nature of participation in the 
commission of the offense; (3) the recruitment of accomplices; 
(4) the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the 
crime; (5) the degree of participation in planning or organizing 
the offense; (6) the nature and scope of the illegal activity; 
  
and (7) the degree of control and authority exercised over 
others.  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, commentary, n.4.  The commentary also 
acknowledges that more than one person can qualify as a leader of 
a criminal conspiracy, and emphasizes that the aggravating role 
enhancement "is included primarily because of concerns about 
relative responsibility."  Id. & background. 
 It is stipulated that the entire loss incurred as a 
result of the scheme totalled approximately $321,000.  The 
Government does not contest Hunter's assertion that she never 
possessed a substantial portion of these sums.  Hunter argues 
that the fact that she led a low-income lifestyle is the most 
compelling and objective evidence that she was not a 
"supervisor." 
 While it may be true that Hunter's low-income lifestyle 
weighs against the "claimed right to a larger share of the fruits 
of the crime" factor, we do not believe that considering the 
record as a whole, the district court was clearly erroneous in 
its decision to give an enhancement.   
 The district court imposed on Hunter two points, the 
lowest enhancement under § 3B1.1.  The district court stated: 
 Because if you look at the record, if you 
look at the presentence report, she is up to 
her eyeballs here.  She recruited Guzman, 
Tr[e]vino, she received credit card 
information from them and others; she used 
credit card data to place orders for N[u] 
Skin; she created fictitious distributors; 
she signed fraudulent credit card slips 
herself . . . . 
 
 Because these are all managerial type things, 
or at least her role here was clearly 
managerial.  I mean I suggest that when and 
  
if Mr. Fanelli is convicted, he will get more 
than a two point enhancement.  He will get at 
least a three.  Because his role was greater 
than hers.  But that is not inconsistent with 
saying that she too was a manager and 
supervisor of Guzman, of Tr[e]vino, for 
starters. 
 
App. at 42-43.  The district court also recognized Hunter's 
argument that her sentence should not be enhanced because she did 
not profit as much as Fanelli, yet nevertheless was persuaded 
that based on the facts in the record as a whole, there was 
sufficient basis for the two point enhancement.  App. at 48. 
 We conclude that there was ample support in the record 
for the district court's enhancement determination.  As the 
district court found, the fact that Hunter did not receive the 
bulk of the profits or live a lavish lifestyle as a result of the 
crime does not change the analysis of her relative individual 
conduct and culpability.  The district court was not clearly 
erroneous in concluding that Hunter was a manager or supervisor.  
We will affirm the order enhancing Hunter's sentence by two 
points.  
 
 III. 
 Hunter also argues that the district court erred in 
imposing restitution in the amount of $75,000 by not considering 
Hunter's financial resources and ability to pay.  Our review over 
whether the district court incorrectly imposed an order of 
restitution is bifurcated; plenary review is exercised over 
whether the law permits the award, but the particular award is 
  
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Furst, 918 
F.2d 400, 408 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Pollak, 844 
F.2d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 
475, 480 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
 Title 18, Section 3664(a) of the United States Code 
provides: 
 The court, in determining whether to order 
restitution under section 3663 of this title 
and the amount of such restitution, shall 
consider the amount of the loss sustained by 
any victim as a result of the offense, the 
financial resources of the defendant, the 
financial needs and earning ability of the 
defendant and the defendant's dependents, and 
such other factors as the court deems 
appropriate. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1990).  In this regard, the 
district court stated at sentencing: 
 I will impose an order of restitution 
consistent with what I believe, from the 
records, will be Miss Hunter's future ability 
to pay restitution.  I recognize she has an 
$18,000 restitution judgment that's in 
default now with the state, I recognize she's 
defaulted on her student loan, I recognize 
she's been in bankruptcy.  I recognize as 
well though that she has the ability to work.  
In fact, she is working now and that in the 
future, at least over the period of 
supervised release, she'll be able to pay 
some portion of the restitutionary obligation 
that would be due here. 
 
App. at 38-39.   
 The district court subsequently ordered restitution in 
the amount of $75,000 to be paid during the period of supervised 
release in installment payments.  The court stated, "[t]his 
  
restitutionary obligation is jointly and severally with those of 
her co-defendants."  App. at 59.  
 We believe that these findings are insufficient for 
purposes of determining Hunter's ability to pay restitution.  We 
note that a defendant's current indigency is not determinative in 
calculating a restitution order.  Congress recognized that 
indigency may be temporary and, if necessary, even an indigent 
offender may be compelled to pay restitution.  United States v. 
Carrara, No. 94-5204, 1995 WL 75853, at *4 (3d Cir. Feb. 27, 
1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)).  However, the district court 
failed to make the necessary factual findings on all factors 
bearing on Hunter's current and future ability to pay $75,000 in 
restitution.  Based on the admittedly limited record on appeal 
before us, we can perceive no reasonable basis for believing that 
Hunter will be able to discharge the obligation of restitution 
that the district court has ordered.   
 We recently discussed the purposes of restitution in 
Carrara: 
 Restitution has customarily been awarded to 
answer various penological concerns.  It is 
primarily restorative and is supposed, at 
least partially, to replace victims in the 
financial position they occupied before the 
offense was committed against them.  See 
generally S.Rep No. 532, 97th Cong.2d Sess. 
30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 
2536-39.  In that sense, restitution is also 
remonstrative, and, where indicated, will 
require that offenders disgorge their 
illgotten gains.  United States v. Woods, 986 
F.2d 669, 678-81 (3d Cir. 1993).  Then too, 
restitution is rehabilitative because it 
permits or indeed requires that offenders 
personally face what they have done and, at 
  
least partially, atone for their legal 
transgressions by direct action in the form 
of a positive personal performance.  Congress 
requires, however, that when restitution is 
indicated the district court consider both 
the loss sustained by the victim and the 
offender's financial resources, financial 
needs, and present and potential earning 
ability.  18 U.S.C. § 3664(a). 
 
1995 WL 75853, at *3 (footnotes omitted). 
 We have consistently required district courts "`to make 
specific findings as to the factual issues that are relevant to 
the application of the restitution provisions of the [Victim and 
Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1982)].'" United 
States v. Logar, 975 F.2d 958, 961 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Palma, 
760 F.2d at 480).  While it is certainly appropriate for a 
district court to consider a defendant's ability to earn income 
in the future, restitution is only appropriate in an amount that 
the defendant can realistically be expected to pay.  Logar, 975 
F.2d at 964. 
 The district court erred by relying solely on its 
conclusory statement that, "she is working now and that in the 
future, at least over the period of supervised release, she'll be 
able to pay some portion of the restitutionary obligation that 
would be due her."  App. at 39.  This finding does not adequately 
support the restitution order.  We can foresee no possibility on 
the facts in the record that Hunter will be able to make the 
$75,000 restitution payments during the three years of supervised 
release, given Hunter's salary and reasonable expenses.1  While 
                     
1
.  The presentence investigation report provides a summary of 
Hunter's financial condition.  The district court adopted the 
  
it is true, as the Government argues, that a district court may 
"aim high" in calculating a restitution order, the amount of 
$75,000 appears to be unfounded in light of Hunter's limited 
resources and future ability to pay.2   
 We next discuss the significance of the district 
court's statement that "[t]his restitutionary obligation is 
jointly and severally with those of her co-defendants."  App. at 
59.  It is not clear from the record whether the district court 
intended for Hunter to be individually responsible for the 
$75,000 restitution, or whether Hunter was jointly and severally 
liable with the other defendants.  We note that Guzman had been 
(..continued) 
factual findings in the presentence report.  App. at 66, 72.  The 
report states that on April 9, 1994, Hunter provided the 
probation office with a personal financial statement that 
reflects that she has no assets other than personal furniture and 
clothing.  Her debts include a delinquent college loan amounting 
to $3,125 and restitution of $18,000 ordered by the Middlesex 
County Superior Court.  A review of Hunter's credit report by the 
probation office verified the delinquent student loan.  Hunter 
does not have any other history of credit cards, lines of credit 
or financial history because all of her previous debts were 
cleared by a bankruptcy order.  Hunter filed for personal 
voluntary bankruptcy under Chapter Seven of the Bankruptcy Code.  
The debt listed on the bankruptcy application amounted to 
approximately $15,000.  Hunter's net salary per month is $1,806.  
Her necessary monthly living expenses for rent, food, utilities, 
telephone and restitution amount to $1,210.  The report concludes 
that Hunter has a positive monthly cash flow of approximately 
$600.  Nothing in this record would indicate that she has 
additional resources or other ability to discharge the obligation 
of restitution. 
2
.  We do not mean to suggest that a district court must conduct 
a full-blown evidentiary hearing and make such precise findings 
regarding a defendant's income and expenses as often occurs in 
matrimonial litigation.  However, we must insist that in crafting 
the ultimate restitution order, the district court consider the 
reasonable expectation of payment. 
  
sentenced to $7,000 in restitution, and we cannot comprehend on 
this record joint and several liability where the amount of 
restitution ordered for each defendant is different.  We do not 
mean to imply that joint and several liability is improper as a 
matter of law or inappropriate under the facts of this case.3  We 
agree with well-settled law that the state's interests in justice 
and rehabilitation should allow a district court the discretion 
to impose joint and several liability on multiple defendants.  
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 7 F.3d 1537, 1540 (10th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 453-54 (5th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424, 435 (9th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042, 108 S. Ct. 773 (1988); 
United States v. Tzakis, 736 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1984).  Nor 
does the joint and several liability necessarily have to mirror 
the precise culpability of each co-defendant when imposing 
restitution.  See, e.g., United States v. Hand, 863 F.2d 1100, 
1106 (3d Cir. 1988) (in ordering restitution, the fact that 
burden of restitution laid entirely on one co-defendant where two 
co-defendants were equally culpable did not offend the 
Constitution and "certainly, did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion"). 
                     
3
.  We do not foreclose that in fine-tuning orders of restitution 
among co-defendants with varying degrees of culpability in 
criminal conduct, a resourceful district court could fashion an 
order of restitution based on credit to be given to one defendant 
for the restitution paid by co-defendant, and other similar 
refinements.  If a complicated case calls for an imaginative 
restitution scheme, we merely observe that the discretion of a 
district court in these matters is broad, so long as the district 
court comports with 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) and the principles 
announced by this Court. 
  
 However, even if the restitution order were joint and 
several, the district court must nevertheless make specific 
findings on whether Hunter will realistically be able to pay the 
full restitution amount.  Accordingly, we will remand this matter 
to the district court to take evidence and make findings as to 
the amount of restitution that Hunter can realistically be 
expected to pay. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district 
court enhancing Hunter's sentence by two points as a 
manager/supervisor will be affirmed.  However, because the record 
does not adequately support the order of the district court 
setting restitution in the amount of $75,000, we will reverse and 
remand with instructions to hear evidence, make factual findings, 
and enter a new order in an amount appropriate and consistent 
with this opinion. 
